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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 880680-CA 
v. % 
EUGENE MYERS, : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a guilty plea to Forgery, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1978). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989), and Rule 4(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether this case should be dismissed because 
defendant failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial 
court? 
2. Whether defendant received effective assistance of 
counsel? 
CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented 
for review is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with six counts of 
forgery, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-501 (1978). Defendant pled guilty to one count of 
forgery on September 12, 1988, the State dismissed all of the 
other charges in exchange for the plea. Judge Frank G. Noel 
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in 
prison to run consecutively to any other terms defendant was 
serving at the time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 20, 1987, Barbara Harris was arrested at 
the Harmon's grocery store after attempting to cash a forged 
check. While Harris was being detained, the security guard at 
Harmons asked if anybody was with her. She stated "that there 
was a gold car out in the parking lot with the other people that 
were with her." (S.T. 6). She said one of them was her sister-
in-law (S.T. 15, 26). When Deputy Churchich arrived, Nick 
Roberts, an off-duty deputy working as a security guard, advised 
him of the forgery situation inside the store and that the 
accomplices were probably in the gold Cadillac in the parking lot 
(S.T. 7-8). Roberts joined Churchich in the patrol car (T. 8). 
After observing the gold Cadillac, the only gold car 
in the parking lot, they pulled up behind the vehicle (S.T. 7-8). 
There were two parties in the car: a female was in the front 
The transcript of August 16, 1988, motion to suppress hearing 
will hereinafter be referred to as "S.T." The transcript of the 
plea proceedings of September 12, 1988 will be referred to as 
"T.P." 
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passenger seat and a male was sitting in the back seat, right 
side. Before contacting the suspects, Deputy Roberts contacted 
the Salt Lake City Police Department, Detective Division. The 
Salt lake City Police Department informed him that there were 
several parties involved in cashing these checks. They also 
instructed the deputy to stop the vehicle because the parties in 
the car were accessories to the check writing situation (S.T. 
26). 
The woman in the gold Cadillac looked back through the 
back window at the patrol car and then she slid to the driver's 
seat and started the car. It looked like she was going to pull 
away, so Deputy Churchich activated the lights on his patrol car 
(S.T. 8-9). The woman then stopped the car (S.T. 9). 
Defendant was the male occupant. As Deputy Roberts 
approached the passenger side he observed defendant putting his 
left hand inside his coat as if he were going to retrieve a gun. 
With his left hand, defendant then moved a tan colored envelope 
from under his leg on the seat, to the floorboards and then 
stepped on it. Also, he pushed something black under the seat 
with his foot (S.T. 10-11). Roberts asked defendant to step out 
of the car and patted him down for weapons (S.T. 11). Roberts 
asked for permission to search the vehicle and defendant 
consented (S.T. 11). Roberts immediately retrieved the envelope. 
Inside the envelope, which was open, were several more checks 
just like the one cashed inside Harmon's and phony identification 
(S.T. 12). The other object under the seat was a small, black, 
toy pistol that resembed a Colt Automatic 38 (S.T. 12-13). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
The court stated that "There was probable cause to make a stop" 
coupled with the information given to the deputy by the Salt Lake 
City Police Department (S.T. 36). 
On September 12, 1988, the defendant was scheduled to 
proceed to trial; however, he elected to change his plea to 
guilty. At the request of Salt Lake County Attorney David Yocom, 
one of his former law partners, James Barber, appeared in court 
as counsel for the defendant (T.P. 2-3). Defendant pled guilty 
to count III of the Third Amended Information which alleged 
Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501. The court relied upon a guilty plea affidavit (R. 
182-84). In addition, the court asked defendant if he had read 
the affidavit and asked him whether he felt he understood it. 
Defendant responded, "I fully understand it." (T.P. 8) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea 
and this Court should dismiss this appeal. Even if this Court 
chooses to address the merits of the appeal it may affirm 
defendant's plea. Defendant's plea was voluntarily entered in 
compliance with Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The trial court apprised defendant that by entering a 
guilty plea, defendant would relinquish certain constitutional 
rights and the state would be precluded from proving the elements 
of his crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The affidavit defendant 
signed specified what those rights were. 
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Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of 
counsel. Neither deficient performance, nor prejudice* is 
established by the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT MAY NOT RAISE CLAIMS ATTACKING HIS 
GUILTY PLEA FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, 
BUT, EVEN IF THIS COURT CONSIDERS HIS CLAIMS, 
HIS PLEA WAS VALID. 
Initially, we roust address the fact that the record 
does not indicate that defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. According to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), this Court should not entertain an attack on a guilty plea 
first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances or plain error. Ici. at 1311. On the other hand, 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment might be construed as a 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea (R. 149). However, he did not 
raise the same issues in that motion that he now raises in this 
Court. This appeal should, therefore, be dismissed because 
defendant failed to move for relief in the trial court. 
In the event that this Court chooses to address the 
merits of defendant's claims, the State maintains that 
defendant's guilty plea was validly entered. After defendant 
entered his guilty plea, Judge Noel alerted defendant that he was 
relinquishing his constitutional rights (T.P. 5) and that the 
state would not be required to prove the elements of his crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt (T.P. 7). Admittedly, the judge did 
not articulate specifically the nature of the constitutional 
rights defendant was waiving. The "Statement of Defendant" 
-s-
signed by defendant did specify those rights (R. 182-84). 
Defendant unequivocally stated that he fully understood what this 
plea would entail and that he was entering the plea voluntarily 
(T.P. 8). 
Defendant argues that at the time that he pled guilty 
to forgery, the trial court erred by failing to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 11(e)(3). Rule 11(e)(3) provides: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) (Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(3) (Supp. 
1989, repealed effective July 1, 1990)). 
Defendant points out that the trial court did not 
specifically inquire whether he understood that by pleading 
guilty he waived his rights against self-incrimination, to 
confrontation, and to a jury trial. Defendant maintains that 
strict, and not just substantial, compliance with the rule is 
required and failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 
11(e)(3) necessitates setting aside the guilty plea. Defendant 
relies on State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987), 
where the court stated that an affidavit may be used to promote 
efficiency, but it is only the starting point for the judge. A 
judge should still question the defendant concerning his 
understanding of the affidavit and review it with the defendant 
to fulfill the Rule 11 requirement, Ixi. at 1313. 
Similarly, defendant relies on State v, Vasilacopulos, 
756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988) and State v. Valencia, 7T6 P.2d 1332 
(Utah App. 1989). Although these cases stand for the proposition 
that strict and not just substantial compliance is required under 
Rule 11(e)(3) and Gibbons, they are inconsistent with recent Utah 
Supreme Court rulings and should not be followed. Defendant's 
argument that the record as a whole test applies only in pre 
Gibbons cases lacks merit. 
Recently, in Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
(Utah Aug. 22, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court found that although 
the trial judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11 when Jolivet 
entered his plea, 
"[T]he absence of a finding under [section 
77-35-11] is not critical so long as the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
that the defendant entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights he was 
waiving." State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
309,310 (Utah 1985). 
115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. 
Decided prior to Jolivet, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266 (Utah 1988), also applies the record as a whole test. The 
Copeland court said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. [459,] 
470 . . . . (emphasis in the original). We 
think the most effective way to do this is to 
have a defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover/ the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. 
765 P.2d at 1273. 
Scrutinizing Gibbons reveals that the court was 
recommending the best method of determining the voluntariness of 
a plea, not imposing a "strict compliance" test. Copeland 
clearly states that strict Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely 
required when a guilty plea is otherwise voluntary. Thus, 
substantial compliance is sufficient where the record establishes 
that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently. See also State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 
(Utah 1986) (technical Rule 11 violations do not automatically 
invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea). 
In State v. Thurston, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 32-33 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court applied the record as a whole 
test to a post-Gibbons guilty plea citing to, inter alia, 
Copeland, Jolivet and Kay. Thurston did not acknowledge either 
Vasilacopulos of Valencia, nor cite to Gibbons. Apparently, this 
Court has abandoned the strict compliance rule articulated in 
Vasilacopulos and Valencia. As stated above, the test is whether 
the record as a whole establishes that the plea was entered "with 
full knowledge and understanding of its consequences, and the 
rights [defendant] is waiving." Thurston, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
33. 
In the instant matter, the trial judge relied upon an 
affidavit which defendant signed and acknowledged that* he had 
read (R. 182-184). Before accepting the defendant's guilty plea, 
the trial judge asked him several questions. Judge Noel asked 
whether defendant had reviewed the statement with his attorney, 
and whether he read and understood the document. Defendant 
responded by expressly saying "I fully understand it" (T.P. 4). 
The judge also specifically asked defendant if he had any 
questions about it (T.P. 4). The judge did not stop there. He 
also told defendant that the document contained certain 
constitutional rights, and that entering a plea waives those 
constitutional rights (T.P. 5). 
Also, Judge Noel conscientiously alerted the defendant 
that in order to be convicted of forgery, the state would be 
required to prove each and every one of the elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Judge Noel further asked defendant if he 
understood that if he entered a guilty plea, the state would not 
be required to make that proof. Defendant positively and 
unequivocally responded, "Right" (T.P. 7). 
Defendant knew that he had a right to a jury trial. 
Defendant was representing himself at the time the trial court 
made the minute entry of September 9, 1988 (R. 235) which 
scheduled a jury trial for September 12, 1988. Defendant also 
had personally cross-examined the witnesses who appeared at the 
suppresion hearing. Defendant is not unfamiliar with the legal 
system, as is evidenced by the many pleadings he filed on his own 
behalf in this case. The record as a whole establishes that he 
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knew he had the right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses and 
to avoid self-incrimination. His guilty plea was valid. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Next, defendant claims that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. He relies on Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984), which established the standard for 
determining the existence of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed this standard. State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). In order to prevail on 
such a claim, a defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered 
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner which 
performance fell below an objective standard, and second that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. Defendant 
must overcome a strong presumption that counsel was adequate. 
State v. Bullock, P.2d , , 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 
(1989). 
First, defendant must show specific acts or omissions 
which fall outside the range of professionally competent 
assistance. State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989). 
Indeed, the record does not indicate that Mr. Barber reviewed 
defendant's police report or reviewed a transcript of the 
suppression hearing. Nor does it indicate that he did not review 
these items. The record is silent on this issue. This does not 
establish that Barber failed the first prong of the test. 
Defendant claims that Barber was ineffective because he 
did not advise defendant to go to trial or to enter a conditional 
-i n_ 
plea to preserve the suppression issue. Defendant asserts that 
he now recognizes that the suppression ruling would have been 
appealable and that he may have prevailed on appeal. Thus, he 
argues that Barber's performance was deficient and prejudicial to 
him. The record does not disclose whether Barber advised 
defendant concerning the possibility of appealing the suppression 
ruling one way or the other. The record does not establish that 
Barber was deficient in this respect. Assuming for argument's 
sake that Barber failed to give any advice in this area, this 
Court should still find that counsel was adequate. 
To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. Carter, 776 P.2d at 893. Review of the 
suppression hearing transcript reveals that Judge Noel's denial 
of the motion to suppress would not have been overturned on 
2 
appeal even if defendant had preserved the right to appeal it# 
The statement of Barbara Harris that accomplices to the 
forgery were in a gold car coupled with the request from the Salt 
Lake City Police Department to stop the suspect vehicle 
established reasonable suspicion for the initial stop of the car. 
2 
It is important to note that defendant may not directly 
challenge the suppression ruling because his unconditional plea 
waives all nonjurisdictional issues not relating to the validity 
of the plea itself. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 
1989). Thus, he may only prevail if he establishes that counsel 
was ineffective by allowing him to plead unconditionally when he 
had an issue that would have resulted in suppression of the 
evidence on appeal. See State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). (Defendant must establish a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result absent counsel's deficient 
performance) 
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State v, Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) ("an officer 
may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' 
that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime"); 
State v, Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Additionally, the officers observed the woman in the car with 
defendant attempt to drive away when she saw the officers. While 
this action, alone, would not establish a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, in this factual context the suspect's furtive 
movements could be construed as incriminating. See State v. 
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968) " [Deliberately furtive 
actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers 
are strong indicia of men rea, and when coupled with specific 
knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the 
evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in 
the decision to make an arrest.") 
Defendant asserts that there was no reasonable 
suspicion to detain him because his version of the evidence is 
that the officer did not have specific knowledge relating him to 
a crime. This assertion is misguided. The trial court chose to 
believe that the officer was told that the people in the gold car 
in the parking lot were involved in the crime. Had the 
suppression issue been preserved for appeal, this Court would 
have deferred to the trial court's findings of fact unless 
clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987); Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327. Based upon the facts supporting 
the trial court's legal conclusion that there was probable cause 
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to arrest defendant, this Court would most likely have found on 
appeal of the suppression issue that the trial court's legal 
conclusion, which applied an even stricter standard than 
required, was not erroneous. See Oates v, Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 
659 (Utah 1988) (appellate court applies a correction of error 
standard on review of trial court's legal conclusions); and 
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327. For this reason, defendant would not 
likely have obtained a different result on the suppression issue 
and counsel's failure to preserve the issue for appeal was not 
prejudicial. 
Finally, defendant ignores that the evidence also 
revealed that he consented to the search of the Cadillac. 
Regardless of the validity of the stop, absent evidence that 
defendant was coerced to grant his consent as a consequence of 
the illegal stop, defendant's consent renders the evidence 
admissible. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989), United States v. 
Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1989). This Court could 
uphold the lower court's admission of the evidence on this basis. 
State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (appellate court 
may affirm decision of lower court to admit evidence on any 
proper ground). Defendant has not established, therefore, that 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had he 
either gone to trial or entered a conditional plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests- this Court 
to dismiss the appeal for failure to move to withdraw the plea or 
to affirm defendant's conviction on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ day of April, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
/'»•?,( u//~Sj'</' 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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